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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of a segmented labor market with efficient wage–
employment bargaining on the internal labor market and a competitive external labor
market on the temporary equilibrium of a closed monetary macroeconomy of the AS–
AD type with government activity, fiat money, and expectations. Workers have identical
preferences, those on the internal labor market are represented by a labor union. There
is no mobility between the labor markets.
Union power measured by the share of the production surplus allotted to the union
and union density measured by the fraction of workers who are union members impact
the functional income distribution, but neither affect the individual employment levels
nor the aggregate employment level and the aggregate supply function. The wage on the
internal labor market is above the wage on the external labor market if and only if the
profit share of total revenue is smaller than under a fully competitive labor market.
Unique temporary equilibria exist for all combinations of union power and union den-
sity. The paper provides a complete comparative-statics analysis showing in particular a
negative price effect of union power and a positive price effect of union density. In gen-
eral, the effects of union power and union density on any equilibrium value are usually of
opposite signs. Single-labor-market models with a fully competitive or a fully unionized
labor market are special or limiting cases of the segmented-labor-market model.
∗Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW) and Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management
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1 Introduction
Centralized bargaining between a producer (or a producers’ association) and a labor union is
a common feature of (Western) economies and a typically observed procedure to determine
wage levels and/or working conditions including working hours. However, only a fraction
of workers are actually organized in unions; on average in OECD countries, one out of six
workers are a union member, with country-specific values ranging from above 92% in Iceland
to less than 5% in Estonia (see OECD 2017, Chapter 4, also for data on other countries
and a time series).1 Therefore, centralized bargaining usually coexists with other forms of
labor market interaction, i.e. the labor market is segmented. As Taubman & Wachter (1986)
already point out, the segmented labor market (SLM) approach addresses numerous aspects of
allocative issues and institutional design, mainly departing from the observation of a dualism
between a firm-specific internal labor market with high-wage “good” jobs and an external labor
market with low-wage “bad” jobs. In their seminal work, Doeringer & Piore (1971) were the
first to describe the dichotomy of the labor market. The terminology primary and secondary
sector, which is also used by Doeringer & Piore (1971) and many others, is intentionally avoided
here to allow for a different meaning of the sectors of the economy. Within this literature,
McDonald & Solow (1985) present the first formal model of the labor market consisting of a
unionized and a nonunionized market segment. They extend McDonald & Solow (1981) who
model a fully unionized labor market, see also the expositions in the textbooks by Booth (1995)
and Landmann & Jerger (1999). Both papers, however, are partial-equilibrium models of the
labor market(s), thus not allowing for the analysis of cross-market effects such as the interplay
of different earning schemes on consumption and on savings.
Other contributions published at the same time as McDonald & Solow (1985), which also em-
ploy segmented labor markets in a partial-equilibrium framework tend either to use an insider–
outsider approach which gives those already employed market power or to use efficiency wages
that provide a rationale for why a producer voluntarily pays “more than necessary”, i.e. a
wage above the market-clearing level at which there is excess labor supply. Lindbeck & Snower
(1986) argue nonformally that wage differentials can be attributed to costly labor turnover
and thus in order to avoid these costs incumbent workers (the insiders) are employed at a wage
which is above the market-clearing one. It is excess labor supply (from outsiders) that results in
unemployment. Bulow & Summers (1986) combine the efficiency-wage (or shirking) model and
SLM model, explaining involuntary unemployment by workers queuing for primary-sector jobs.
Gottfries & McCormick (1995) obtain a similar result in a model in which primary-sector em-
ployment requires firm-specific training. Since firms are imperfectly informed about individual
productivity before the training is completed – they receive only a signal –, a secondary-sector
job is taken as a bad sign. Therefore, firms never hire workers from these jobs with the result
that some workers rather choose voluntary unemployment in the primary sector than employ-
ment in the secondary sector. A further aspect dealt with in the literature is the effects of a
minimum wage on wage determination in a growth model with a segmented labor market (see
for instance Flaschel & Greiner 2011).
The main objective of this paper is to explore the cross-market effects within a closed monetary
1Union coverage, i.e. the share of workers who are employed under a centralized contract, is usually signifi-
cantly higher than union density; approximately twice as high on average (OECD 2017). Cahuc & Zylberberg
(2004, Chapter 7) explain this by legal and institutional issues such as the possibility for nonunion members to
free ride on the bargaining agreement in some countries or the legal obligation to engage in collective bargaining
in most French firms.
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macroeconomy with a segmented labor market. Choosing the standard AS–AD model which is
presented in great detail in Böhm (2017) as a general framework, this paper extends the model
with a fully unionized labor market as presented in Böhm (2017) and in Böhm & Claas (2012)
to one with a fully unionized internal labor market and a competitive external labor market,
creating heterogeneity within labor supply through union membership. In the short run, i.e.
within a given period, union membership is fixed so that neither union members may leave the
union nor nonunionized workers join.2 The setup with one aggregate firm is maintained, i.e.
this single firm is active on both labor market segments. The drivers of this model are union
density (the share of unionized workers to all workers), which measures the relative size of the
labor markets, and the bargaining power of the union on the internal labor market. This paper
will discover the channel(s) through which union density and union power operate; these could
be the aggregate supply function and the functional income distribution which feeds into the
aggregate demand function.
While the question concerning supply-side and demand-side effects is only relevant for the
general equilibrium, the following questions will be addressed both on the partial-equilibrium
and on the general-equilibrium level: (1) whether the firm receives higher profits than under a
fully competitive labor market due to additional choice, (2) whether a unionized worker receives
a higher wage and/or works less than a nonunionized worker due to union power exercised on
the internal labor market, i.e. before the firm’s activity on the external labor market, and (3)
whether the external labor market can dry out under certain conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model with a fully unionized
internal labor market and a competitive external labor market and obtains the partial equi-
libria on both labor markets. In Section 3, the model is closed, the full general equilibrium is
derived, and its comparative-statics properties are analyzed. Section 4 compares the temporary
equilibrium under a segmented labor market to the ones with a fully competitive labor market
and with a fully unionized labor market while Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy with a Segmented Labor Market
Consider a monetary macroeconomy of the AS–AD type (see Böhm 2017, for a presentation
of the AS–AD model in its standard form and several variations) in discrete time with over-
lapping generations of heterogeneous consumers, with one (aggregate) firm, and with a gov-
ernment/central bank. Economic activity takes place in three sectors – public, consumption,
and production – and on four markets – commodity, internal labor and external labor, and
money. Consumers are either shareholders or workers; shareholders and workers differ in their
consumption–savings behavior. Workers have identical preferences, but only some are mem-
bers of a labor union which creates additional heterogeneity within labor supply. While union
members supply labor exclusively to the internal labor market which is governed by an efficient
bargaining procedure between the union and the firm, all other workers supply their labor to
the competitive external labor market only.3
2This is discrimination in the sense of Cahuc & Zylberberg (2004, Chapter 5).
3In line with Katz (1988) who concludes that workers move across markets “only gradually” and
Dickens & Lang (1988) who “cast serious doubts on workers’ ability to choose their sector of employment”,
this paper deals with the implications of an exogenously given union membership structure on the temporary
equilibria of the economy; workers do not join or leave the union within a given period. The dynamics of
union membership (i.e. of coalition formation in game-theoretic wording) are to be analyzed as part of the
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The interaction between the agents in the economy is described in detail in the next section.
2.1 The Sectors of the Economy and the Union
The production sector consists of one4 profit-maximizing firm which produces a single com-
modity using a sufficiently smooth, Inada-type production function
F : R+ → R+, z 7→ F (z)
with labor z as the only input. The firm receives labor zilm ≥ 0 from a unionized internal labor
market and demands labor zelm ≥ 0 on a competitive external labor market; labor from the two
sources are perfect substitutes. Wage payments are the only costs incurring. Let p > 0 denote
the (nominal) market price, and let wilm, welm > 0 denote the different wage rates. Then profits
are given by
Πslm(p, wilm, welm, zilm, zelm) := pF (zilm + zelm)− wilmzilm − welmzelm, (1)
which is the difference between nominal returns from production and the wage sums.5 The firm
acts as a price taker on the competitive commodity market and on the external labor market.
Thus, it takes the commodity price p and the wage welm paid on the external labor market as
parametrically given.
The Public Sector
The public sector consists of a government and a central bank. The government demands the
amount g ≥ 0 of the produced commodity, which is purchased at market price and which is
used to provide public goods to the economy. These public goods do not induce any marginal
effects by the agents in the economy. In order to finance its spendings, the government levies
proportional taxes on profit income (τπ) and on wage income (τw), with 0 ≤ τπ ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ τw ≤ 1.
The government parameters g, τw, and τπ are assumed to be parametrically given
6 so that –
in general – the government’s budget is not balanced. According to the deficit/surplus of the
budget, the central bank creates/destroys fiat money which is held by consumers and which is
the only intertemporal store of value in the economy. No interest is paid on savings so that the
amount of money holdings M ≥ 0 by consumers at the beginning of a given period are equal
to the amount of savings at the end of the previous period.
The Consumption Sector
The consumption sector consists of overlapping generations of three types of consumers: share-
holders, unionized workers, and nonunionized workers. All consumers live for two consecutive
intertemporal evolution of the economy.
4The generalization to several homogeneous firms which are organized in a producers association is straight-
forward.
5Since the profit function is different from one with only one type of labor input, the subscript “slm” (short
for segmented labor market) is added. The same procedure is applied to other functions not coinciding with
their counterparts in the model with a single labor market.
6For this reason, g, τw, and τpi are suppressed throughout this paper to simplify notation.
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periods and only receive income during the first period so that their second-period consumption
has to be financed entirely by savings. In each generation, there are ns homogeneous share-
holders and nw workers with identical preferences. Shareholders do not work while workers
only receive wage income.7 A fraction γ of the workers, 0 < γ < 1, are union members, i.e.
there are γnw homogeneous unionized workers; the remaining (1− γ)nw homogeneous workers
are nonunionized. The number γ denotes union density, i.e. the proportion of workers who are
union members. All consumers take the commodity price p > 0 as given and share a common
point forecast pe > 0 for next period’s commodity price.
In each period, the young shareholders earn the firm’s net profits, which is their only source of
income. Due to a homothetic utility function, their propensity of consumption 0 ≤ c(θe) ≤ 1 is
a function of the expected rate of inflation θe := pe/p only. The shareholders save the remainder
of their net income in the form of money to be consumed in the second period of their lifes.
Every young worker supplies labor ℓ at a wage w and entirely saves the net wage income
(1− τw)wℓ in the form of money. A young worker’s consumption–labor decision is based on the
additively separable utility function
u : R2+ → R, u(ℓ, c
e) := ce − v(ℓ),
which is the difference of the planned (“expected”) consumption in next period ce and the
disutility from labor v(ℓ).8 The disutility function v(ℓ) is assumed to be strictly increasing,
convex, and satisfying v(0) = v′(0) = 0.9 A worker thus faces the optimization problem
max
(ℓ,ce)∈R2+
{
ce − v(ℓ)
∣∣∣∣ (1− τw)wℓ = pece
}
which is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (1 − τw)wℓ = p
ece. Straightforward
calculations show that the worker’s individual labor supply is given by
ℓ
!
= (v′)−1
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)
which is strictly increasing in the expected net real wage (1− τw)w/p
e. Since a worker achieves
a utility of u(0, 0) by not working, any feasible wage–labor supply pair (w, ℓ) must satisfy the
individual participation constraint
u(0, 0) = 0 ≤ u
(
ℓ, (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ
)
or
(1− τw)
w
pe
≥
v(ℓ)
ℓ
.
Under competitive conditions, aggregating the labor supply of all nw workers yields the aggregate
competitive labor supply function
Ncom
(
w
pe
)
:= nw(v
′)−1
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)
7These assumptions are made for the ease of exposition only.
8Using a homothetic utility function instead would allow for consumption in both periods.
9Restricting the domain of v to the compact interval from zero to some finite maximal labor supply level
would not change the way this model is solved as long as the production capacity exceeds the minimal aggregate
demand.
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which is an increasing and invertible function of the expected net real wage w/pe. Assuming
equal treatment of all workers, the inverse aggregate competitive labor supply function is given
by
Scom(L) :=
1
1− τw
v′
(
L
nw
)
which is the expected real wage workers need to be paid to work the amount L, i.e. to work
L/nw each. This function also is strictly monotonically increasing and invertible. Similarly, the
aggregate participation constraint, which denotes the minimal expected real wage workers need
to be paid to supply L altogether or L/nw each, is given by
Sres(L) :=
1
1− τw
v(L/nw)
L/nw
;
the subscript “res” indicates that peSres(L) is the workers’ reservation wage function. Because
of the convexity of v, the function Sres is strictly monotonically increasing and invertible.
Although all workers have identical preferences implying that their individual supply behavior
and their participation constraints are the same, their labor is supplied on two distinct markets
and therefore feeds into two distinct aggregates. Since the γnw unionized workers on the internal
labor market (ilm)10 do not necessarily receive a wage payment at a competitive level, their
market behavior is characterized by the minimal wage peSres(Lilm/γ) they need to be paid in
order to supply the total amount of labor Lilm or Lilm/nw each. The labor supply of the (1−γ)nw
nonunionized workers on the competitive external labor market (elm)11 is proportional to the
competitive labor supply of all workers, i.e. their aggregate competitive labor supply at a wage
welm is (1− γ)Ncom(welm/p
e). Accordingly, their inverse aggregate competitive labor supply is
Scom(Lelm/(1− γ)) which is a function of the employment level Lelm.
The Union
It is assumed that the unionized workers’ joint labor supply Lilm is controlled by one labor
union which maximizes the aggregate excess wage bill, i.e. the wage sum paid above the workers’
reservation wage peSres(Lilm/γ).
12 Therefore, the union’s objective function is given by
Ωslm : R
3
+ × (0, 1)→ R, Ωslm(p
e, wilm, Lilm, γ) := wilmLilm − p
eSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm (2)
where wilm is the wage paid to union members. In contrast to the model with a single labor
market, the excess wage bill (2) depends additionally on the union density parameter γ.
10The subscript “ilm” is used to identify variables and functions which are exclusive to the internal labor
market.
11Whenever variables and functions refer to the external labor market, they carry the subscript “elm” to
distinguish them from their counterparts on the internal labor market.
12Farber (1986) presents and discusses a number of union objectives, in particular their relation to the workers’
individual utility function. The approach taken here is more specific than the one by, e.g., McDonald & Solow
(1985) who rather consider the difference between the indirect utilities from the bargaining wage and the
reservation wage. However, for every fixed employment level, the “objective is consistent with each worker
having a linear within-period utility of income”, as Card, Devicenti & Maida (2014) report. Furthermore,
assuming the excess wage bill as the union’s objective allows for aggregating over heterogeneous workers.
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2.2 Clearing of the Labor Markets
The labor market is assumed to be segmented into an internal, fully unionized labor market
and an external, competitive labor market which are cleared sequentially: First, on the internal
labor market, the firm and the union efficiently bargain over the wage rate wilm > 0 paid to
all union members and the aggregate employment level Lilm ≥ 0 simultaneously. Second, on
the external labor market, the firm is allowed to demand additional labor Lelm at the wage
welm > 0. It is assumed that the producer only hires external workers in addition to its internal
workforce, i.e. the firm may not threaten to replace the internal workers by externals.13 This
implies that the bargaining parties have to agree on a positive outcome before the firm may
enter the external labor market.
The firm’s two-stage profit maximization problem is solved by backward induction using sub-
game consistency. Therefore, as a first step, the firm’s second-stage labor demand is determined
for a given first-stage bargaining outcome. Then, as a second step, the bargaining problem in
the first stage is solved subject to the firm’s second-stage response to the bargaining. Finally,
the wage on the competitive external labor market is determined endogenously.
The External Labor Market
Consider a positive bargaining outcome (wilm, Lilm)≫ 0,
14 which has been reached in the first
stage, and, since the external labor market is a competitive market on which the firm acts as
a price taker, let a commodity price p > 0 and a wage welm paid on the external labor market
be given. The firm, knowing this data, demands labor on the external market Lelm such that
it maximizes its profit function, i.e.
max
Lelm≥0
{
Πslm(p, wilm, welm, Lilm, Lelm)
}
= max
Lelm≥0
{
pF (Lilm + Lelm)− wilmLilm − welmLelm
}
.
(3)
In spite of the fact that the wage bill wilmLilm and the wage paid to the unionized workers wilm
enter the profit function, neither of the two affects the firm’s external labor demand function:
An interior solution to the maximization problem (3) solves Lelm
!
= (F ′)−1(welm/p) − Lilm;
because of the strict concavity of the profit function, the firm’s best response function is given
by
Lelm = max
{
(F ′)−1
(
welm
p
)
− Lilm, 0
}
=: h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
. (4)
Since hcom(w/p) := (F
′)−1(w/p) is the labor demand function of a profit-maximizing firm on a
competitive market with profit function Π(p, w, z) := pF (z) − wz, the term (F ′)−1(welm/p) −
Lilm = hcom(welm/p) − Lilm denotes the difference between the internal employment level and
the profit-maximizing labor demand. If such a gap exists, the firm fills it with external workers;
otherwise, no external workers are hired.
13If the firm was allowed to replace all internal workers by externals, the wage paid on the internal labor
market would always be lower than the one paid on the external market. The implications of this assumption
are discussed in Appendix 6.3.
14The notation “≫ 0” is used to indicate that all components of a vector are positive.
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The Bargaining Problem on the Internal Labor Market
On the internal labor market, the firm and the union efficiently bargain over the employment
level Lilm and the wage wilm in order to maximize their nominal payoffs, i.e. the firm’s profit
function (1) and the union’s excess wage bill function (2). Since both parties implicitly assume
that the outcome of the bargaining has no influence on the equilibrium wage on external market
and the equilibrium price on the commodity market, they take a commodity price p > 0, a point
forecast for next period’s commodity price pe > 0, and a wage welm > 0 paid on the external
labor market as given. However, they take the firm’s best-response function on the external
labor market Lelm = h(welm/p, Lilm) into account, i.e. they are fully aware of the consequences
of the bargaining to the firm’s subgame-perfect labor demand on the external labor market.
Therefore, the two objective functions are given by
Πslm
(
p, wilm, welm, Lilm, h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
= pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− wilmLilm − welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
and
Ωslm(p
e, wilm, Lilm, γ) = wilmLilm − p
eSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm.
A failure of the bargaining would lead to a complete shutdown of production, i.e. Lilm = 0 and
Lelm = 0, which would imply that the payoff levels for both agents were zero. In particular,
since unionized workers are not able to sell their labor on the external market, this would imply
zero utility for each union member which is below the utility level the nonunionized workers
receive from supplying labor to the external labor market.
Let
B(pe, p, welm, γ) :=
⋃
wilm,Lilm≥0



Πslm
(
p, wilm, welm, Lilm, h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
Ωslm(p
e, wilm, Lilm, γ)



 (5)
denote the set of payoffs which can be supported by wage–employment pairs (wilm, Lilm). Then,
for (pe, p, welm, γ) given, the bargaining problem of the producer and the union is given by the
pair (
B(pe, p, welm, γ),
(
0
0
))
where the set B(pe, p, welm, γ) is called the feasible set of the bargaining (or just bargaining set)
and the point
(
0
0
)
∈ B(pe, p, welm, γ) is the so-called status-quo point. The status-quo point is
the outcome that would be reached if the bargaining failed.
In general, an (asymmetric) bargaining solution is a payoff vector which satisfies the following
four properties: feasiblity, Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and invariance of scale and
translation.
The Employment Levels
The set of efficient employment–wage pairs on the internal labor market, the Pareto curve
or contract curve, is depicted in Figure 1 for two given levels of the external-labor-market
Oliver Claas Labor Market Segmentation and Efficient Bargaining
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0
0 Lilm
wilm
L∗ilm hcom(
welm
p )
welm
Ωslm = 0
Πslm = 0
(a) Low welm
0
0 Lilm
wilm
welm
Ωslm = 0
Πslm = 0
L∗ilmhcom(
welm
p )
(b) High welm
Figure 1: The employment level and the wage on the internal labor market; p, pe, γ, welm given
wage welm.
15 Each point on the contract curve is the tangency point of one iso-profit and
one iso-excess wage bill curve (the thin lines). Since both utility functions are linear in the
wage bill wilmLilm, the marginal effects of a wage change are of same size, but of opposite sign.
Therefore, the contract curve is a vertical line segment in the space of employment and wages
(the bold blue line), i.e. the efficient employment level L∗ilm is independent of the internal-labor
market wage level. The panels of the figure present two scenarios which correspond to positive
labor demand on the external labor market (Figure 1(a); welm low) and zero labor demand
for external labor (Figure 1(b); welm high). Note that the level curves of the excess wage bill
are not affected through the change of the wage welm while the family of isoprofit curves are
differently shaped for Lilm < hcom(welm/p). Most importantly, all isoprofit curves above the
gray line are strictly monotonically decreasing while the isoprofit curves below the gray line
have a unique maximum. The gray line, which is the isoprofit curve for the profit level under
a single, fully competitive labor market with wage welm, is flat for Lilm < hcom(welm/p) and
decreasing for Lilm > hcom(welm/p).
Table 1: Standard parametrization
A B C τπ = τw λ γ M g p
e c nw
1 0.6 0.5 0.68 0.5 0.8 0.33 0.86 1 0.5 1
Due to the linearity of the utility functions in the wage bill wilmLilm, the producer and the
union are risk-neutral and transfer payoffs linearly through the wage bill. In other words, the
bargaining problem for any given employment level Lilm – in particular the efficient one – is a
zero-sum game between the two agents. In such situations, the bargaining set is a halfspace
15All diagrams in this paper are drawn to scale using an isoelastic production function F (z) = AzB/B
with A > 0 and 0 < B < 1, a logarithmic intertemporal utility function log c0 + δ log c
e with δ ≥ 0, and an
isoelastic disutility from labor v(ℓ) = C(C + 1)−1ℓ1+1/C with 0 < C < 1. This implies a constant propensity
of consumption of young shareholders c ≡ (1 + δ)−1 and an isoelastic reservation wage function Sres(L) =
C(C + 1)−1(1− τw)
−1(L/nw)
1/C . The parametrization given in Table 1 is used if not indicated otherwise.
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with slope minus one, and the locus of its boundary is determined by the joint surplus
Πslm
(
p, wilm, welm, Lilm, h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
+ Ωslm(p
e, wilm, Lilm, γ)
= pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
− peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm,
which is independent of the bargaining wage wilm. More precisely, for (p
e, p, welm, γ) given,
the boundary of the halfspace is the linear function Πslm = pF (Lilm + h(welm/p, Lilm)) −
welmh(welm/p, Lilm)− p
eSres(Lilm/γ)− Ωslm.
The property that, for every employment level Lilm, all bargaining sets are halfspaces with a
mutual slope allows for a criterion to choose the employment level Lilm independently of the
bargaining wage wilm: Since every bargaining solution is Pareto efficient, the employment level
Lilm is chosen jointly at the level which maximizes the joint surplus, i.e.
hilm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
:= arg max
Lilm≥0

pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
− peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm

. (6)
The joint surplus can be seen as the cake to be shared in the bargaining. Thus, choosing the
employment level Lilm determines the size of the cake to be split and the bargaining wage wilm
determines how to split the surplus between the firm and the union.
The function describing the employment level under efficient bargaining has an explicit formu-
lation which is subject of the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. The solution of the maximization problem (6), i.e. the efficient-bargaining em-
ployment level Lilm, is given by the function
hilm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
=


γNcom
(
welm/p
pe/p
)
, if hcom
(
welm
p
)
≥ γNcom
(
welm/p
pe/p
)
heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)
, otherwise
= min
{
γNcom
(
welm/p
pe/p
)
, heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)}
,
(7)
where heff(p
e/p, γ) is the solution of pF ′(Lilm)
!
= peScom(Lilm/γ).
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
The two branches of hilm(welm/p, p
e/p, γ) reflect two scenarios, depending on whether the firm’s
demand for labor on the external market is positive or not: In the first scenario, the employment
level γNcom(welm/p
e) is the same level the unionized workers would supply at wage welm under
competitive conditions. Therefore, it makes no difference for a worker which labor market he
is attached to as long as the same wage is paid on both markets; note that unionized workers
receive higher utility if the wage on the internal labor market is higher than the one on the
competitive market. In the second scenario, in which the firm does not demand labor on the
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external labor market, the firm and the union behave as if there was no external market. This
situation is the same as the one described in Böhm & Claas (2014), with the labor supply of
γnw workers. Due to the fact that the number of workers depends on union density γ, the
employment level heff(p
e/p, γ) depends on γ.
For (pe, p) ≫ 0 and 0 < γ < 1 given, the employment level hilm(welm/p, p
e/p, γ) can be read
off horizontally in Figure 2. The figure illustrates that the firm’s labor input comes from
both markets if the wage on the external labor market welm is sufficiently low, namely be-
low pF ′(heff(p
e/p, γ)) whereas the external labor market dries out for high wages, i.e. above
pF ′(heff(p
e/p, γ)), so that the firm and the union are in a classical efficient-bargaining situation.
0
0 Lilm, Lelm
welm
heff(
pe
p , γ)
welm low
welm high Lilm
Lilm Lelm
peScom(
Lilm
γ )
pF ′(Lilm + Lelm)
h−1ilm(Lilm,
pe
p , γ)
Figure 2: The employment levels and the wage on the external labor market; p, pe, γ given
Inserting the employment level function (7) into the firm’s best response function (4) yields the
firm’s labor demand function on the competitive market as a function of the real competitive
wage welm/p, the expected rate of inflation p
e/p, and union density γ.
Corollary 2.1. The firm’s labor demand on the competitive external labor market is given by
the function
Lelm = h
(
welm
p
, hilm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
))
= max
{
hcom
(
welm
p
)
− hilm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
, 0
}
= max
{
hcom
(
welm
p
)
− γNcom
(
welm/p
pe/p
)
, 0
}
=: helm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
.
(8)
In particular, the employment level functions (7) and (8) depend on the wage on the external
labor market welm and on the good’s price on the commodity market p. Before their equilib-
rium values are determined endogenously, the wage function on the internal labor market is
calculated.
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The Wage on the Internal Labor Market
Under the assumption that a failure of the union–firm bargaining would result in a complete
shutdown of production, both agents would receive a payoff of zero if no agreement could
be found. Since this payoff level can be reached unilaterally by either agent, the individual
rationality of the bargaining parties implies two participation constraints. In the case of the
firm, it is
0
!
≤ Πslm
(
p, wilm, welm, Lilm, h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
⇐⇒ 0
!
≤ pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− wilmLilm − welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
⇐⇒ wilm
!
≤
pF (Lilm + h(
welm
p
, Lilm))− welmh(
welm
p
, Lilm)
Lilm
=: WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm).
The union’s participation constraint is
0
!
≤ Ωslm(p
e, wilm, Lilm, γ)
⇐⇒ 0
!
≤ wilmLilm − p
eSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm
⇐⇒ wilm
!
≥ peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
=: WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ).
The functions WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm) and WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ) denote the maximal and the minimal
wage at which an agent agrees on a bargaining, i.e. the firm’s and the union’s reservation wage
functions. Both reservation wage functions are continuous and homogeneous of degree 1 in
(p, welm). While WΩslm is differentiable, WΠslm has a kink at hcom(welm/p) = Lilm.
Note that the range of individually rational bargaining wages
WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ)
!
≤ wilm
!
≤ WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm)
is nonempty if and only if
0
!
≤
(
WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm)−WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ)
)
Lilm
= pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
− peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm,
i.e. if and only if the joint surplus is positive. In particular, this is the case for Lilm =
hilm(welm/p, p
e/p, γ) at which the joint surplus is maximal.
Let 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 denote the (relative) bargaining power of the union and let the commodity
price p, its next period forecast pe, the competitive wage welm, and union density γ be given.
Furthermore, consider some Lilm such that WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ) < WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm). Due to
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the specific structure of the bargaining problem,16 the (asymmetric) bargaining solution to the
firm’s and the union’s bargaining problem is given by the convex combination with coefficient
λ of the “corner points” of the bargaining set at which the entire surplus (WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm)−
WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ))Lilm is allotted to one party, i.e.(
WΠslm(p, welm, Lilm)−WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ)
)
Lilm
(
1− λ
λ
)
. (9)
The bargaining solution (9) is induced by the bargaining wage function
wilm = λWΠslm(p, welm, Lilm) + (1− λ)WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ) (10)
which is the convex combination of the two reservation wage functions. The bargaining solution
is a function which is homogeneous of degree one in (p, pe, welm) because of the homogeneity of
degree one in (p, pe, welm) of both reservation wage functions. Recall that the union’s reservation
wage WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ) = p
eSres(Lilm/γ) is less than the inverse labor supply p
eScom(Lilm/γ).
Therefore, for a range of small levels of λ, i.e. for a “weak” union, the bargaining wage wilm is
below the wage that would be paid under full competition at the employment level Lilm/γ.
The Wage on the External Labor Market
For a given commodity price p and its next-period forecast pe, any equilibrium competi-
tive wage welm > 0 forces the firm’s labor demand on the competitive external labor mar-
ket helm(welm/p, p
e/p, γ) > 0 to be positive because the competitive external labor supply
(1 − γ)Ncom(welm/p
e) > 0 is positive. Therefore, an equilibrium competitive wage welm needs
to solve
helm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
= hcom
(
welm
p
)
− γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
!
= (1− γ)Ncom
(
welm
pe
)
(11)
which holds true if and only if
hcom
(
welm
p
)
!
= Ncom
(
welm
pe
)
. (12)
The first and remarkable observation is that this equation is independent of union density γ
as well as the number of unionized workers γnw. However, the most astonishing property of
this equation is that it is identical to the market clearing condition as under full competition.
This implies that for any pair of the commodity price and its forecast for the following period
(p, pe) ≫ 0, the wage on the competitive labor market is the same as the wage in a fully
competitive labor market. The solution of (12) with respect to the real wage welm/p is given by
the implicitly defined function Welm : R+ → R+ which is a function of the expected inflation
pe/p. Then
Welm
(
pe
p
)
≡ Wcom
(
pe
p
)
. (13)
16Since both bargaining agents are risk-neutral, the bargaining set is a halfspace in payoff space, and the
contract curve is vertical in the employment–wage space. In such situations, the generalized Zeuthen solution
which coincides with the generalized Nash solution yet requiring less properties, is applicable. If the union was
more risk-averse than the firm, the contract curve would be upward-sloping which implies that the bargain-
ing solution (and the employment–wage pairs inducing it) would depend on the solution concept chosen; see
Gerber & Upmann (2006) for a discussion.
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The functionWelm inherits all properties fromWcom, in particular,Welm is strictly monotonically
increasing and invertible with the explicitly given inverse
W−1elm
(
welm
p
)
=
welm
p
Scom
(
hcom
(
welm
p
)) . (14)
Since the elasticity17 of W−1elm
EW−1elm
(
welm
p
)
= 1− EScom
(
hcom
(
welm
p
))
Ehcom
(
welm
p
)
> 1,
is greater than unity, 0 < EWelm(
pe
p
) < 1 holds true which implies that the real wage function
Welm is usually strictly concave in expected inflation p
e/p. Since the firm’s demand function
on the external labor market is always positive in equilibrium, substituting Welm(p
e/p) into
the function of the employment level under bargaining (7) and the external labor demand
function (8) yields
hilm
(
Welm
(
pe
p
)
,
pe
p
, γ
)
≡ γhcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
(15)
and
helm
(
Welm
(
pe
p
)
,
pe
p
, γ
)
≡ (1− γ)hcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
. (16)
This equation shows that, in equilibrium, the employment level on the external labor market
is always positve, i.e. that the competitive market cannot dry out due to some configuration
on the bargaining market. Adding up the employment levels on the two labor markets yields
that the level of equilibrium aggregate employment is given by
hilm
(
Welm
(
pe
p
)
,
pe
p
, γ
)
+ helm
(
Welm
(
pe
p
)
,
pe
p
, γ
)
≡ hcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
, (17)
which also is the aggregate employment level for a fully competitive labor market. Therefore,
the aggregate employment level is independent of union density γ. The employment levels
on the two markets are proportional to the aggregate employment level; the proportion of
the bargaining employment level being union density. Regardless of union membership, the
individual labor supply of each worker is hcom(Welm(p
e/p))/nw so that workers only differ by
the wage payment they receive and not by their employment levels.
The wage on the internal labor market is obtained by inserting the employment level func-
tion (15) and the competitive wage function welm = pWelm(p
e/p) into the bargaining wage
function (10). By taking advantage of homogeneity, the real-wage function on the internal la-
bor market is described by a function Wilm : R+× [0, 1]× (0, 1)→ R+ of the expected inflation
pe/p, union power λ, and union density γ.
Now, the real wage under bargaining is obtained as a function Wilm : R+ × [0, 1]× (0, 1)→ R+
of the expected inflation pe/p, union power λ, and union density γ by inserting the employment
17The elasticity of a differentiable function f at x with f(x) 6= 0 is defined as Ef (x) := f
′(x)x/f(x).
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level function (15) and the competitive wage function welm = pWelm(p
e/p) into the bargaining
wage function (10). It is given by
Wilm
(
pe
p
, λ, γ
)
:= λWΠslm
(
1,Welm
(
pe
p
)
, γhcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
)))
+ (1− λ)WΩslm
(
pe
p
, γhcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
, γ
)
.
(18)
Let L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)) denote the aggregate employment level and write the real wage on
the competitive external labor market Welm(p
e/p) = h−1com(L) = F
′(L) as the marginal product
of production. Then, writing the firm’s reservation wage function as a markup over of the
average product F (L)/L
WΠslm
(
1,Welm
(
pe
p
)
, γhcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
)))
= WΠslm (1, F
′(L), γL)
=
F (L)− (1− γ)F ′(L)L
γL
=
1− (1− γ)F ′(L)L/F (L)
γ
F (L)
L
=
1− (1− γ)EF (L)
γ
F (L)
L
shows that the markup depends on the elasticity of production EF (L) and union density γ.
Using Scom(L)/Sres(L) = Ev(L/nw) = ESres(L) + 1 shows that the union’s reservation wage
function
WΩslm
(
pe
p
, γhcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
, γ
)
=WΩslm
(
pe
p
, γL, γ
)
=
pe
p
Sres(L)
=
pe
p
Scom(L)
ESres(L) + 1
(14)
=
F ′(L)
ESres(L) + 1
=
EF (L)
ESres(L) + 1
F (L)
L
,
with L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)), is a markdown of the average product. Combining these two results
yields
Wilm
(
pe
p
, λ, γ
)
=
(
λ
1− (1− γ)EF (L)
γ
+ (1− λ)
EF (L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
F (L)
L
(19)
with L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)). Similarly, the union’s reservation wage function can be written as
a markup over the labor supply function under fully competitive conditions
Wilm
(
pe
p
, λ, γ
)
=
(
λ
1− (1− γ)EF (L)
γEF (L)
+ (1− λ)
1
ESres(L) + 1
)
pe
p
Scom(L) (20)
with L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)). Note that
EWilm(λ) ∈ (0, 1) and EWilm(γ) ∈ (−1, 0)
while the partial derivative with respect to the expected rate of inflation cannot be signed
in general. If the effects stemming from the elasticities are sufficiently small, Wilm is strictly
monotonically increasing in θe.
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2.3 The Functional Income Distribution
On both labor markets, wages and employment levels can be expressed as functions of the
expected inflation pe/p and the union parameters λ and γ, see equations (18), (15), and (16).
It is informative to compute the factor shares of the different types of income, i.e. wage and
profit income. To this end, let L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)) denote the aggregate employment level so
that the efficient and the competitive levels of employment are given by Lilm = γL and Lelm =
(1−γ)L > 0, and the corresponding wages are wilm = pWilm(p
e/p, λ, γ) and welm = pWelm(p
e/p).
Thus, the profit share of total revenue is given by
pF (L)− wilmLilm − welmLelm
pF (L)
=
1− λ
(
1− (1− γ)EF (L)
)
− (1− λ)γ
EF (L)
ESres(L) + 1
− (1− γ)EF (L)
= (1− λ)
(
1− EF (L)
(
1− γ
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
))
∈ [0, 1]. (21)
Similarly, the wage share of total revenue18 is given by
wilmLilm + welmLelm
pF (L)
= λ
(
1− (1− γ)EF (L)
)
+ (1− λ)γ
EF (L)
ESres(L) + 1
+ (1− γ)EF (L)
= 1− (1− λ)
(
1− EF (L)
(
1− γ
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
))
∈ [0, 1].
In general, because of L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)), the shares of profits and wages on total revenue
can be expressed as a function of the expected rate of inflation pe/p, of union power λ, of and
union density γ. If F and Sres are isoelastic functions in labor, the wage share of total revenue
is constant in the expected rate of inflation and only depends on the union parameters λ and
γ.
Multiplying the profit share (21) by total revenue pF (L) to obtain equilibrium profits
(1− λ)
(
1− EF (L)
(
1− γ
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
))
pF (L), L = hcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
(22)
easily shows that the profit can be higher or lower than
(
1− EF (L)
)
pF (L), L = hcom
(
Welm
(
pe
p
))
,
depending on the levels of the union parameters λ and γ. Since the aggregate employment level
in the model with a fully competitive labor market and in the present model are identical, the
levels of bargaining power λ and union density γ determine in which setting the firm’s profit is
higher.
18The wage shares for unionized and nonunionized workers can be computed separately.
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2.4 The Rate of Underemployment
Define the rate of underemployment as the relative gap between the desired labor supply of all
workers at their individual wages and the actual employment level as
Uslm
(
Lilm, Lelm,
wilm
pe
,
welm
pe
)
:=
γNcom(wilm/p
e) + (1− γ)Ncom(welm/p
e)− Lilm − Lelm
γNcom(wilm/pe) + (1− γ)Ncom(welm/pe)
= 1−
Lilm + Lelm
γNcom(wilm/pe) + (1− γ)Ncom(welm/pe)
.
(23)
The rate of underemployment is a measure of the aggregate labor market. Thus, if union density
decreases (increases), the impact, which the difference between the unionized workers’ desired
and actual labor supply exerts on Uslm, is reduced (increased). In the limiting cases, the rate of
underemployment approaches the one of a single competitive labor market (γ → 0) or a fully
unionized labor market (γ → 1).
Let the commodity price p > 0 and its next period expectation pe > 0 be given and consider the
situation when the labor markets are in equilibrium. Then, because of (12), Ncom(welm/p
e) =
hcom(welm/p) =: L so that
Uslm
(
γL, (1− γ)L,
wilm
pe
,
welm
pe
)
= 1−
L
γNcom(wilm/pe) + (1− γ)L
. (24)
Evaluating (14) at wilm/p = F
′(L) yields that pe/p = W−1elm(F
′(L)) so that
wilm
pe
=
Wilm(p
e/p, λ, γ)
pe/p
=
Wilm(W
−1
elm(F
′(L)), λ, γ)
W−1elm(F
′(L))
shows that Uslm can be written in terms of L (or, equivalently, expected inflation p
e/p) and the
union parameters λ and γ.
If the production function F , the reservation wage function Sres, and the competitive labor
supply function Ncom are isoelastic with elasticities B, 1/C, and C, the aggregate employment
level L cancels out because of (20) so that the rate of underemployment (24) becomes
Uslm
(
γL, (1− γ)L,
wilm
pe
,
welm
pe
)
= 1−
1
γ
(
λ1−(1−γ)B
γB
+ (1− λ) C
C+1
)C
+ (1− γ)
= 1−
1
1 + γ
((
C
C+1
+ λ
(
1−B
γB
+ 1
C+1
))C
− 1
)
(25)
which depends only on the elasticities and on the union parameters λ and γ, i.e. it is independent
of the expected inflation pe/p. While the function (25) is increasing in union power λ, the effects
of an increase of union density γ are ambiguous.
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3 The Temporary Equilibrium with a Segmented Labor
Market
In the previous section, the employment levels and wages have been determined as functions
of the commodity price p > 0, its next period forecast pe > 0, the union’s bargaining power
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and union density 0 < γ < 1. These are the prerequisites to close the model, to
determine the temporary equilibrium – in particular the equilibrium price –, and its properties.
In addition to the parameters pe, λ, and γ, aggregate money holdings M ≥ 0 which are held by
old consumers are the data at the beginning of an arbitrary period. To facilitate notation, let
m :=M/p and θe := pe/p denote real money balances and the expected inflation.
3.1 Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand
Although the employment levels on the two labor markets each depend on union density γ, the
aggregate employment level L = Lilm+Lelm = hcom(Welm(θ
e)) is independent of γ, as shown in
equation (17). The level of bargaining power λ affects the bargaining wage only, but neither
the employment levels on the labor markets nor the aggregate employment level. Therefore,
the aggregate commodity supply function, i.e. the output the firm produces from the labor input
L = hcom(Welm(θ
e)), is a function of the expected inflation θe alone. It is defined as
AS slm : R++ → R++, AS slm (θ
e) := F (hcom (Welm (θ
e))) . (26)
The aggregate commodity supply function is a strictly monotonically decreasing function in
expected inflation with an explicitly given inverse
AS−1slm(y) =W
−1
elm
(
F ′
(
F−1(y)
))
=
F ′ (F−1(y))
Scom (F−1(y))
.
Since the aggregate supply function is strictly decreasing in θe = pe/p, it is strictly monotonically
increasing in the commodity price p. Equation (13), which states that the wage functions Welm
(the wage on the external labor market) and Wcom (the wage as under a fully competitive labor
market) are identical, implies that the aggregate supply functions under a segmented labor
market AS slm and under a fully competitive labor market AS com are identical, i.e.
AS slm(θ
e) ≡ AS com(θ
e).
Therefore, compared to a single, fully competitive labor market, the labor market specification
(and, in particular, the different wages paid on the labor markets) induces no change to the
supply side of the economy.
Due to the overlapping-generations structure of consumers, young consumers face a consump-
tion–savings decision. Because of the specific assumptions made, only the propensity 0 ≤
c(θe) ≤ 1 of the net profit income is consumed by the young shareholders while the wage
income is saved entirely. Thus, aggregate real demand y is the sum of real money balances
m, public demand g, and the demand by the young shareholders which, as seen in (21), is
proportional to y. Therefore, given money balances M , a price expection pe, the bargaining
weight λ, and union density γ, as well as the public demand g and the tax rate τπ on profit
income, income consistency implies that the aggregate demand y has to solve
y =
M
p
+ g + c
(
pe
p
)
(1− τπ)(1− λ)
(
1− EF (L) + γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
y, (27)
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with L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)).19
Define the demand multiplier with respect to real money balances m = M/p and government
demand g as a function c˜slm : R+ × [0, 1]× (0, 1)→ [0, 1] of expected inflation θ
e = pe/p, union
power λ, and union density γ by
c˜slm (θ
e, λ, γ) := 1− c (θe) (1− τπ)(1− λ)
(
1− EF (L) + γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
,
with L = hcom(Welm(θ
e)) so that (27) becomes m+ g = c˜slm(θ
e, λ, γ)y.
The demand multiplier is strictly monotonically increasing in bargaining power λ and strictly
monotonically decreasing in union density γ; the effect of expected inflation cannot be signed
in general. Then, the income-consistent aggregate demand function solving (27) for y is given
by
Dslm : R
2
+ × [0, 1]× (0, 1)→ R+, Dslm (m, θ
e, λ, γ) :=
m+ g
c˜slm(θe, λ, γ)
(28)
which is strictly monotonically increasing in real money balances m, strictly decreasing in
bargaining power λ, and strictly increasing in union density γ; the effect of price expectations
θe is ambiguous. Note that the effects of union power and union density cannot be signed
generally if young workers consumed as well.
If F and Sres are isoelastic functions in labor with elasticities B and 1/C, with B and C in the
unit interval, then the aggregate demand function is given by
Dslm (m, θ
e, λ, γ) =
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−B + γ
B
C+1
)
.
If the propensity to consume c′ ≥ 0 increases in expected inflation, the aggregate demand
function is monotonically increasing in expected inflation θe and strictly decreasing in nominal
prices p, i.e.
dDslm
(
M
p
, p
e
p
, λ, γ
)
dp
= −
m
p
∂Dslm (m, θ
e, λ, γ)
∂m
−−
θe
p
∂Dslm (m, θ
e, λ, γ)
∂θe
< 0.
3.2 The Price Law
For the remainder of this paper, assume that ∂c˜slm/∂θ
e ≤ 0. Then, the aggregate demand func-
tion (28) is strictly decreasing in nominal prices p whereas the aggregate supply function (26)
is strictly increasing in nominal prices p.
For any tuple (M, pe, λ, γ) ∈ X := R2+× [0, 1]× (0, 1), the temporary equilibrium of the economy
is given by a price p ≥ 0 which clears the commodity market, i.e.
AS slm
(
pe
p
)
= Dslm
(
M
p
,
pe
p
, λ, γ
)
. (29)
Lemma 3.1. Let the aggregate supply function AS slm be globally invertible with AS
′
slm(θ
e) < 0,
and assume that ∂Dslm/∂m > 0, ∂Dslm/∂θ
e ≥ 0 hold. Then, for every (M, pe, λ, γ) ∈ X , there
exists a unique positive temporary equilibrium price p ≥ 0 solving the above stated market-
clearing equation (29).
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Figure 3: The temporary equilibrium price
Figure 3 shows the aggregate supply–aggregate demand diagram of the commodity market.
of Lemma 3.1. Since the aggregate supply function is invertible, it has full range so that there
is excess demand for small prices while supply exceeds demand for high prices; because of
the continuity of the excess demand function, the market-clearing price exists. Its uniqueness
follows from the monotonicity of the supply and demand functions.
Let the temporary equilibrium price be denoted by the price law
Pslm : X → R+, p = Pslm(M, p
e, λ, γ).
The price law is a time-invariant mapping of the state space X into the positive reals. It is
homogeneous of degree 1 in (M, pe) ≫ 0 for any given (λ, γ) ∈ [0, 1] × (0, 1). Applying the
implicit function theorem on the excess demand function Dslm(M/p, p
e/p, λ, γ) − AS slm(p
e/p)
yields
∂Pslm
∂M
=
1
Pslm
∂Dslm
∂m
− p
e
Pslm
2AS
′
slm +
M
Pslm
2
∂Dslm
∂m
+ p
e
Pslm
2
∂Dslm
∂θe
> 0
with an elasticity
0 < EPslm(M) =
EDslm(m)
−EASslm(θ
e) + EDslm(m) + EDslm(θ
e)
< 1.
Because of the homogeneity of the price law, 0 < EPslm(p
e) < 1 and, in particular, ∂Pslm/∂p
e > 0
hold true. The positive effects of money balances and price expectations on the equilibrium
price are depicted in Figure 4. Similar calculations yield
∂Pslm
∂λ
< 0 and
∂Pslm
∂γ
> 0.
Figure 5 displays how the union parameters λ and γ affect the temporary equilibrium. The left
panel of Figure 5 shows the ranges of prices and aggregate output for all values of bargaining
19If young workers consumed as well, terms consisting of their net propensity of consumption times their
according wage shares were added.
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Figure 4: Comparative-statics effects of money balances and price expectations
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Figure 5: Comparative-statics effects of union power and union density
Oliver Claas Labor Market Segmentation and Efficient Bargaining
3. The Temporary Equilibrium with a Segmented Labor Market 23
power λ ∈ [0, 1], for given money balances M , price expectations pe, and for a given degree of
unionization γ. The right panel of Figure 5 depicts the ranges of prices and aggregate output
for all values of union density γ ∈ (0, 1) and for given money balances M , price expectations
pe, and union power λ = 0. Bigger levels of union power would result in smaller changes of
the demand multiplier c˜slm and thus in smaller ranges of the equilibrium values. Both figures
indicate that there is a nonlinear feedback from the union parameters on the equilibrium price.
3.3 The Equilibrium Mappings
The equilibrium price induces the equilibrium wages, employment levels, and the aggregate
output level. These mappings are called the wage laws, the employment laws, and the output
law which are all functions on the state space X and which are defined as follows:
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) := Pslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)Wilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
, λ, γ
)
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ) := Pslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)Welm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
Lilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) := hilm
(
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
,
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
, γ
)
Lelm(M, p
e, λ, γ) := helm
(
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
,
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
, γ
)
Yslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) := AS slm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
Furthermore, the aggregate-employment law and the average-wage law can be defined as follows:
Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
:= Lilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) + Lelm(M, p
e, λ, γ) = hcom
(
Welm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
Wslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
:=
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ)Lilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) +Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)Lelm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
Lslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
= γWilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) + (1− γ)Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ).
Exploiting the structure of the bargaining solution (9), the payoffs laws
Ωslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) := Ωslm(p
e,Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ),Lilm(M, p
e, λ, γ), γ)
Πslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) :=


1−λ
λ
Ωslm(M, p
e, λ, γ), if 0 < λ ≤ 1
0, if λ = 0
(30)
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are defined in the same fashion, and the law of the rate of underemployment is
Uslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) :=
Uslm
(
Lilm(M, p
e, λ, γ),Lelm(M, p
e, λ, γ),
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
pe
,
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
pe
)
.
For any given pair (λ, γ) ∈ [0, 1] × (0, 1), the wage laws are homogeneous of degree 1 in
(M, pe)≫ 0, and the employment and output laws are homogeneous of degree 0 in (M, pe)≫ 0.
Thus, the payoff laws are homogeneous of degree 1 in (M, pe)≫ 0 as well while the law of the
rate of underemployment is of degree 0 in (M, pe)≫ 0.
The comparative-statics effects are derived in Appendix 6.1 and their results are summarized in
the Table 2. The effects of the union parameters λ and γ on equilibrium prices and employment
Table 2: Summary of comparative-statics effects. Parentheses indicate that further assumptions
such as isoelastic specifications required.
M pe λ γ
Pslm + + − +
Wilm (+) (+) ? ?
Welm + + − +
Wslm (+) (+) ? ?
Lilm + − − +
Lelm + − − ?
Lslm + − − +
Yslm + − − +
Πslm (+) (+) (−) (+)
Ωslm (+) (+) ? (+)
Uslm (0) (0) (+) ?
levels as well as on equilibrium payoffs are demonstrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
Figure 6(a) depicts the equilibrium employment levels on both labor markets (the bold blue
lines) as well as their aggregate. It shows that all equilibrium employment levels are always
positive and that they are strictly decreasing and proportional in union power λ. For a small
size of the respective workforce (i.e. γ close to zero or one), the dispersion of the employment
level on the respective market is small. The ranges of the equilibrium levels of employment
with respect to union density γ which are plotted in Figure 6(b) differ in two regards from the
ones depicted in the first panel: First, the employment level on the internal market increases
in union density whereas the employment level on the external market usually decreases.20
Second, since the amount of labor traded on the internal labor market or on the external labor
market approaches zero if γ approaches zero or one, the dispersion of employment levels is
relatively large in union density.
20Counterexamples can be constructed for very high levels of public consumption g and very flat production
functions.
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0
0 p
L
F−1(AS slm(
pe
p ))
hilm(Welm(
pe
p ),
pe
p , γ)
helm(Welm(
pe
p ),
pe
p , γ)
F−1(Dslm(
M
p ,
pe
p , 0, 0))
F−1(Dslm(
M
p ,
pe
p , 0, 1))
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Figure 6: Ranges of prices and employment
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Figure 7: Ranges of payoffs λ resp. γ from zero to one
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Figure 8: Ranges of prices and wages; λ from 0 to 1
The effects of union power λ and union density γ on the equilibrium payoffs are illustrated in
Figure 7. The shaded area contains all possible pairs of equilibrium profitsΠslm and equilibrium
union utility Ωslm for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and 0 < γ < 1. For given λ, all equilibria are located on
a ray through the origin with slope λ/(1 − λ); the boundary cases λ = 0 and λ = 1 coincide
with segments of the axes.21 The value λ/(1− λ) is the ratio of the relative bargaining powers
of the two agents and the ratio of their shares of the joint surplus. Given γ, an increase of λ
therefore results in a counterclockwise rotation of the ray which causes profits to decrease and
union utility to usually increase, i.e. a change in the distribution of the joint surplus. Due to
the positive effect of union density γ on the joint surplus, an increase of γ increases both profits
and union utility, maintaining the same sharing ratio λ/(1− λ).
Figure 8 displays the different effects of union power λ on prices and wages in equilibrium. Both
panels show that, in equilibrium, the wage on the competitive external labor market Welm is
reduced by an increase of union power due to the negative effect of λ on the equilibrium
price Pslm. However, the effect of union power on the wage on the internal labor market is
ambiguous: Figure 8(a) depicts a situation in which an increase of λ leads to a rising wage on the
internal labor market whereas Figure 8(b) indicates that Wilm can be decreasing in λ for some
parametrizations, in particular ones with high government activity. For each parametrization,
there exists one level of union power for which the wages on the two labor markets coincide,
implying that the ranges of wages overlap necessarily and are never disjoint. The wage law
Wilm is aboveWelm if and only if λ is greater than the level of union power for which the wages
on the two labor markets coincide. The dispersion of wages on the external labor market can be
smaller than on the internal market (cf. Figure 8(a)) or bigger (cf. Figure 8(b)). Figure 8(b) also
shows that the effect of union power λ on the average of the two wage laws Wslm is ambiguous
because it is increasing for low levels of λ and decreasing for λ close to one.
If the wage function Wilm is increasing in expected inflation, the real wage paid on the internal
labor market Wilm/Pslm = Wilm(p
e/Pslm) is increasing in λ so that a negative influence of λ
on the wage Wilm can only occur under a dominating price effect ∂Pslm/∂λ. Whenever a
21This property immediately follows from (9) or from (30).
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negative wage effect as shown in Figure 8(b) occurs for wages above the competitive level, i.e.
Wilm > p
eScom(Lilm/γ), the excess wage bill Ωslm is decreasing in λ.
4 Comparison with Economies with Single Labor Mar-
kets
As shown above, the condition (11) which defines a market-clearing wage on the external labor
market can be reformulated as
hcom
(
w
p
)
!
= Ncom
(
w
pe
)
.
This is exactly the labor-market-clearing condition under the absence of a union, i.e. under a
fully competitive labor market. Therefore, the real wage clearing the external labor market
must be the same as the real wage clearing a fully competitive labor market, i.e.
Welm(θ
e) ≡ Wcom(θ
e), (31)
which immediately implies that the aggregate supply functions are identical, i.e.
AS slm(θ
e) ≡ AS com(θ
e). (32)
In order to compare the equilibria under labor market segmentation and under single labor
markets, first consider the level of bargaining power λnat : R+ × (0, 1)→ [0, 1],
λnat(θ
e, γ) := 1−
1− EF (L)
1− EF (L) + γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres (L)+1
, with L = hcom(Wcom(θ
e)).
By construction, the identity of the wage functions (31) induces the following three properties:
First, under labor market segmentation, the wages on the internal and on the external labor
market coincide, i.e.
Wilm(θ
e, λnat(θ
e, γ), γ)
(19)
≡ Welm(θ
e)
so that, second, the profit share of total revenue (21) under labor market segmentation is the
same as the profit share under a fully competitive single labor market, i.e.
(1 − λnat(θ
e, γ))
(
1− EF (L) + γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
, with L = hcom(Wcom(θ
e))
⇐⇒ 1− EF (L), with L = hcom(Wcom(θ
e)),
and, finally, the aggregate demand functions under labor market segmentation and under full
competition are identical, i.e.
Dslm(m, θ
e, λnat(θ
e, γ), γ) ≡ Dcom(m, θ
e). (33)
The level of bargaining power λ = λnat(θ
e, γ) therefore can be interpreted as the “natural” level
of bargaining power at which the (partial-equilibrium) wage on the internal labor market and
the (partial-equilibrium) aggregate employment level are the same.
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Evaluating λnat(p
e/p, γ) at an equilibrium price yields an equilibrium notion of the natural level
of bargaining power: Let λcom : R
2
+ × (0, 1) → [0, 1] be defined as the level of λnat at the
equilibrium price Pcom(M, p
e) under a fully competitive labor market, i.e.
λcom(M, p
e, γ) := λnat
(
pe
Pcom(M, pe)
, γ
)
.
Note that, if F and Sres are isoelastic functions with elasticities B and 1/C, then the two levels
of bargaining power are identical, i.e.
λcom(M, p
e, γ) ≡
γ B
C+1
1−B + γ B
C+1
≡ λnat(θ
e, γ).
Using property (33), and evaluating the demand functions at the price p = Pcom(p
e,M) yields
Dslm
(
M
Pcom(M, pe)
,
pe
Pcom(M, pe)
, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
≡ Dcom
(
M
Pcom(M, pe)
,
pe
Pcom(M, pe)
)
.
This, in combination with the identity of the aggregate supply functions (32), implies that
Pslm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
≡ Pcom(M, p
e)
has to hold. Therefore, the model with a single competitive labor market is the special case
λ = λcom(M, p
e, γ) of the model with a segmented labor market, i.e. the function λcom(M, p
e, γ) is
the equilibrium condition to ensure the same equilibrium price in both models. Straightforward
calculations show that also the aggregate levels of the real variables as well as all wages coincide
in equilibrium, i.e.
Ycom(M, p
e) ≡ Yslm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
,
Lcom(M, p
e) ≡ Lslm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
,
Wcom(M, p
e) ≡ Wslm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
≡ Wilm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
≡ Welm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
.
As before, union density γ determines the relative sizes of the two labor markets, i.e.
Lilm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
≡ γLcom(M, p
e),
Lelm
(
M, pe, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ
)
≡ (1− γ)Lcom(M, p
e).
Because of Wilm(M, p
e, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ) ≡ Welm(M, p
e, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ), the equilibrium rate
of underemployment
Uslm(M, p
e, λcom(M, p
e, γ), γ) = 0
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is zero.
The difference between λcom(M, p
e, γ) and λnat(θ
e, γ) is that λcom is a general-equilibrium map-
ping whereas λnat is a benchmark for analyzing the partial equilibrium on the internal (union-
ized) labor market.
Similarly, because of
lim
γ→1
Dslm(m, θ
e, λ, γ) = Deff(m, θ
e, λ) for all (m, θe, λ)
and AS slm = AS eff , the model with a single labor market governed by efficient bargaining is
the limiting case γ → 1 of the present model:
Peff(M, p
e, λ) ≡ lim
γ→1
Pslm(M, p
e, λ, γ),
Yeff(M, p
e, λ) ≡ lim
γ→1
Yslm(M, p
e, λ, γ),
Leff(Mp
e, λ) ≡ lim
γ→1
Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ),
Weff(M, p
e, λ) ≡ lim
γ→1
Wslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ lim
γ→1
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ).
Also, since limγ→1Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ Wcom(M, p
e) is finite for given (M, pe, λ), the rate of
underemployment approaches the one under a fully unionized labor market
lim
γ→1
Uslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
(23)
= lim
γ→1
1−
Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
γNcom(Wilm(M, pe, λ, γ)/pe) + (1− γ)Ncom(Welm(M, pe, λ, γ)/pe)
= 1−
Lslm(M, p
e, λ)
Ncom(Wilm(M, pe, λ)/pe)
= 1−
Leff(M, p
e, λ)
Ncom(Weff(M, pe, λ)/pe)
= Ueff(M, p
e, λ)
if union density γ approaches one.
5 Summary and Extensions
This paper has presented a monetary macroeconomy of the AS–AD type with a segmented
labor market (SLM) with efficient union–firm bargaining on the internal labor market and a
competitive external labor market which extends Böhm & Claas (2012) and Böhm (2017). The
splitting of the labor market has led to an additional state variable, namely union density γ.
In most cases, the effects of γ are opposite to the effects of the union’s relative bargaining
power λ. Temporary equilibria uniquely exist under the same general set of assumptions as
under the related approaches. The qualitative results are structurally the same, with the only
exception being the equilibrium wage on the external labor market which decreases in the
union’s bargaining power λ.
The union parameters λ and γ directly affect the wage on the internal labor market and
therefore lead to wage differentiation between the two labor markets. Furthermore, they drive
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the functional income distribution which feeds into the aggregate demand function. However,
since the employment levels on the two labor markets are proportional to the respective group
sizes, the individual employment levels are the same for all workers. Thus, the individual
employment levels are independent of the union parameters. For the same reason, both the
aggregate employment level and the aggregate supply function under labor market segmentation
are independent of λ and γ so that all equilibrium effects on the output and employment levels
are solely induced by the price effects.
Whenever the union is “weak”, i.e. if its bargaining power λ is sufficiently close to zero, the
equilibrium wage paid to union members is below the wage on the competitive external labor
market. While this result is similar to the model with a fully unionized single labor market,
it is important to note that the comparison remains a hypothetical one under a single labor
market with a single wage. Here, the result of union bargaining yields an outcome which in
any respect – wage, wage sum, utility – leaves union members worse off than the nonunionized
workers. This heavily depends on the assumption that there is no mobility between the labor
markets within a period. For a similar reason, a temporary equilibrium with a bargaining wage
exceeding the competitive wage due to a “strong” union can only be sustained because the
nonunionized workers are excluded from joining the union and benefiting from its bargaining
power.
Furthermore, both related single-labor-market models are special or limiting cases of the model
with a segmented labor market.
This paper does not provide an analysis of the intertemporal evolution of the economy under
perfect-foresight price expectations and an endogenous savings behavior of consumers. For
given union parameters λ and γ, all results derived in Böhm & Claas (2012) extend to the
SLM setup. Therefore, the properties of the dynamical systems in nominal and in real terms
will be structurally the same as under a single labor market because the only difference is the
multiplier of the aggregate demand function which is a constant in this case. In particular, it
is clear that
• monetary stationary states will not exist generically, and if they exist, they will not be
unique;
• in intensity form, the one-dimensional system of real money balances will have two positive
fixed points for wide ranges of parametrizations; and
• convergence of the dynamical system in intensity form does not necessarily imply that the
growth rates of money holdings and prices converge, i.e. the two-dimensional monetary
system does not always converge to a so-called balanced path even if the associated system
in real terms converges.
However, the eigenvalues of these dynamical systems depend on both union parameters so that
the bifurcation analysis should become richer.
The full dynamics of the economy, i.e. when union power and union density do not remain
constant over time, lead to a number of open questions:
• How do the union parameters adapt over time, i.e. based on which information or sig-
nals do these values react? In particular, which measures of inequality such as wage
differentials lead to joining or leaving the union? What role does the governement play?
• Do stationary states of the economy exist? If yes, are they unique? Are they asymptoti-
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cally stable? What is the impact of the adjustment of the union parameters on stability?
Can there be stationary states with wage differentials or with nonzero rates of underem-
ployment/overemployment?
• Do union power and union density move in opposite directions? If this is the case, the
nonmonotonicity of the time-one map could be the source of cycles.
An analysis addressing the above questions goes beyond the scope of this paper and should
be carried out separately. Due to the higher dimensionality of the problem outlined above, it
remains a challenging but very interesting issue.
The present paper has assumed that the union and the firm – even if they meet repeatedly for
negotiations – behave myopically, i.e. they ignore all intertemporal aspects of the bargaining
although, even under constant union parameters, one would expect that the bargaining outcome
in one period would affect future bargaining positions. This reasoning immediately leads to
the question whether or under which conditions a sequence of equilibria of an economy with
agents who have long-term objectives and who are engaged in periodic efficient bargaining
could be intertemporally optimal.22 It remains an unsolved issue whether deviations from
myopic equilibria are achieved by, for example, not fully exercising bargaining power or by
monetary transfers. Furthermore, the effects of these mechanisms on the evolution of union
density as well as the feedback from changes of union density on the other state variables need
to be understood.
The SLM framework could be extended to allow for heterogeneous firms with a joint external
labor market for all firms and with additional individual internal labor markets for some of
the firms. This extension is interesting because the competition on the external labor market
could yield equilibria at which firms with access to two labor markets only demand from their
internal labor markets, i.e. with zero demand for labor from the competitive external labor
market. Furthermore, strategic union behavior could be analyzed by contrasting one union
facing all firms on internal labor markets to independent unions, i.e. one on each internal labor
market. However, it is highly questionable whether any of these modifications remain to be as
tractable and comparable to the single-labor-market models as the model presented here.
In further research, the efficient-bargaining procedure on the internal labor market should be
replaced by right-to-manage wage bargaining which is often used in the literature. Under right-
to-manage wage bargaining, the producer is allowed to choose the employment level unilaterally
after both parties have bargained over the wage successfully. The single-labor-market case
has been studied in Böhm & Claas (2014). There it is shown that leaving the choice of the
employment level to the employer’s discretion leads to combinations of employment levels and
wages at which the wage sum is independent of union power. Under labor market segmentation,
however, the total wage sum most likely depends on union parameters since the firm’s best-
response function on the external labor market is independent of the wage on the internal
labor market. Without explicitly solving for the partial equilibrium on the labor markets, it
could even be that the firm’s demand function for external labor implied that the total labor
demand function – and thus the aggregate supply function – was independent of any union
parameter. Due to these structural differences with the single-labor-market models and the
efficient-bargaining SLM model, a right-to-manage SLM model is a highly interesting object to
study.
22The only paper so far which deals with subgame-perfect temporary equilibria of a macroeconomy with
intertemporarily optimizing agents and with bargaining is Selten & Güth (1982) which analyzes a real (i.e.
nonmonetary) multiplier–accelerator-type economy with (Nash) wage bargaining.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs
6.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let p, pe, and welm be given. Show that
hilm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
= min
{
γNcom
(
welm/p
pe/p
)
, heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)}
maximizes
max
Lilm≥0
{
pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
− peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm
}
.
Proof. Consider Lilm < hcom(welm/p) and Lilm > hcom(welm/p) separately. Because of
d
dLilm
Sres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm =
(
ESres
(
Lilm
γ
)
+ 1
)
Sres
(
Lilm
γ
)
= Scom
(
Lilm
γ
)
,
the interior solutions to the respective first-order conditions are
Lilm
!
= γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
.
for Lilm < hcom(welm/p) and
Lilm
!
= heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)
for Lilm > hcom(welm/p) which leads to
Lilm
!
= min
{
γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
, hcom
(
welm
p
)}
and
Lilm
!
= max
{
heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)
, hcom
(
welm
p
)}
.
Comparing the objective function at 0 and at γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
pF
(
hcom
(
welm
p
))
− welmhcom
(
welm
p
)
+
(
welm − p
eSres
(
S−1com
(
welm
pe
)))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
> pF
(
hcom
(
welm
p
))
− welmhcom
(
welm
p
)
rules out the boundary solution.
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Since
γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
≷ hcom
(
welm
p
)
is equivalent to
pe
p
≶
welm
p
Scom(
1
γ
hcom(
welm
p
))
=
F ′(hcom(
welm
p
))
Scom(
1
γ
hcom(
welm
p
))
= h−1eff
(
hcom
(
welm
p
)
, γ
)
,
i.e.
heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)
≷ hcom
(
welm
p
)
,
the two cases can be combined to
argmax
Lilm
{
pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
− peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
Lilm
}
= min
{
γNcom
(
welm/p
pe/p
)
, heff
(
pe
p
, γ
)}
= hilm
(
welm
p
,
pe
p
, γ
)
.
which completes the proof.
6.1.2 Comparative Statics
The property 0 < EWelm(
pe
p
) < 1 implies that
EWelm(M) = EPslm(M)
(
1− EWelm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
∈ (0, 1),
EWelm(p
e) = EPslm(p
e) + EWelm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
(1− EPslm(p
e))
= 1 +
(
EWelm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
− 1
)
(1− EPslm(p
e)) ∈ (0, 1),
EWelm(λ) = EPslm(λ)
(
1− EWelm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
< 0,
EWelm(γ) = EPslm(γ)
(
1− EWelm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
> 0.
Because of Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ S−1com(
Welm(M,p
e,λ,γ)
pe
)
ELslm(M) = ES−1com
(
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
pe
)
EWelm(M) > 0,
ELslm(p
e) = ES−1com
(
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
pe
)
(EWelm(p
e)− 1) < 0,
ELslm(λ) = ES−1com
(
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
pe
)
EWelm(λ) < 0,
ELslm(γ) = ES−1com
(
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
pe
)
EWelm(γ) > 0
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Because of Lilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ γLslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
ELilm(M) = ELslm(M) > 0,
ELilm(p
e) = ELslm(p
e) < 0,
ELilm(λ) = ELslm(λ) < 0,
ELilm(γ) = 1 + ELslm(γ) > 1
and, because of Lelm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ (1− γ)Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ),
ELelm(M) > 0, ELelm(p
e) < 0, ELelm(λ) < 0.
Since the elasticity of 1− γ becomes arbitrarily negative as λ approaches one, ELelm(γ) < 0 is
negative for λ sufficiently close to one, but could be positive for γ “small”.
Consider Yslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ AS slm(
pe
Pslm(M,pe,λ,γ)
). Then
EYslm(M) = −EASslm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
EPslm(M) > 0
EYslm(p
e) = EASslm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
(1− EPslm(p
e)) < 0
EYslm(λ) = −EASslm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
EPslm(λ) < 0
EYslm(γ) = −EASslm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
EPslm(γ) > 0
Finally consider
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) = Pslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)Wilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
, λ, γ
)
.
Since all partial derivatives depend on EWilm(θ
e), which cannot be signed in general, no global
statements can be made. If EWilm(θ
e) ∈ (0, 1),23 then
EWilm(M) = EPslm(M)
(
1− EWilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
∈ (0, 1)
EWilm(p
e) = EPslm(p
e) + EWilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
(1− EPslm(p
e))
= 1 +
(
EWilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
− 1
)
(1− EPslm(p
e)) ∈ (0, 1)
Because of sgnEWilm(λ) = −sgnEPslm(λ) and sgnEWilm(γ) = −sgnEPslm(γ), the elasticities
23If F and Sres are isoelastic with elasticities B and 1/C, then EWilm(θ
e) = C(1−B)C(1−B)+1 ∈ (0, 1).
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EWilm(λ) and EWilm(γ) cannot be signed; however, the following bounds can be established.
EWilm(λ) = EPslm(λ)
(
1− EWilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
+ EWilm(λ) < EWilm(λ)
= 1−
γ EF (L)
ESres (L)+1
λ(1− (1− γ)EF (L)) + (1− λ)γ
EF (L)
ESres (L)+1
, L = Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
< 1
EWilm(γ) = EPslm(γ)
(
1− EWilm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
))
+ EWilm(γ) > EWilm(λ)
= −
λ(1− EF (L))
λ(1− EF (L)) + γEF (L)
(
λ+ 1−λ
ESres(L)+1
) , L = Lslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
> −1
Because ofWelm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ F ′(L) ≡ EF (L)
F (L)
L
, with L = Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ), the wage law for
the internal labor market can be decomposed into a markup and the wage law for the external
market, i.e.
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
(19)
=
(
λ
1− (1− γ)EF (L)
γEF (L)
+ (1− λ)
1
ESres(L) + 1
)
Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ).
Rearranging terms in the markup yields
Wilm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
(19)
=

λ
(
1− EF (L)
γEF (L)
+
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
1
ESres(L) + 1

Welm(M, pe, λ, γ)
=

1
γ
λ
1− EF (L)
EF (L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
λESres(L) + 1
ESres(L) + 1

Welm(M, pe, λ, γ)
(34)
which shows that the effects of the union parameters λ and γ on the markup are opposite to
the effects on the wage law for the external market.
Plugging (34) into the equilibrium average wage Wslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) ≡ γWilm(M, p
e, λ, γ) + (1 −
γ)Welm(M, p
e, λ, γ) yields
Wslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
=

λ
(
1− EF (L)
EF (L)
+ γ
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−γ
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
+ 1

Welm(M, pe, λ, γ)
=

λ1− EF (L)
EF (L)
− γ (1− λ)
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+1

Welm(M, pe, λ, γ),
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which on the one hand implies that
∂Wslm
∂M
=
∂Welm
∂M
∈ (0, 1),
∂Wslm
∂pe
=
∂Welm
∂pe
∈ (0, 1)
if EWilm(θ
e) ∈ (0, 1), but, on the other hand, that both union parameters move the markup and
the wage law for the external market in opposite directions so that no general statement can
be made.
Because of (22), the profit law is
Πslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)
= (1− λ)
(
1− EF (L)
(
1− γ
ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
))
Pslm(M, p
e, λ, γ)Yslm(M, p
e, λ, γ),
L = Lslm(M, p
e, λ, γ).
Therefore, if F and Sres are isoelastic, if c(θ
e) is constant, and if λ < 1,
EΠslm(M) = EPslm(M) + EYslm(M) > 0
EΠslm(p
e) = EPslm(p
e) + EYslm(p
e)
= EPslm(p
e) + EASslm
(
pe
Pslm(M, pe, λ, γ)
)
(1− EPslm(p
e))
= EPslm(p
e) (1− EASslm(θ
e)) + EASslm(θ
e)
=
−EASslm(θ
e)
−EASslm(θ
e) + ED(m)
(1− EASslm(θ
e)) + EASslm(θ
e)
>
−EASslm(θ
e)
−EASslm(θ
e) + 1
(1− EASslm(θ
e)) + EASslm(θ
e) = 0
EΠslm(λ) =
−λ
1− λ
+ EPslm(λ) + EYslm(λ) < 0
EΠslm(γ) =
γEF (L)ESres (L)
ESres (L)+1
1− EF (L) + γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres(L)+1
+ EPslm(γ) + EYslm(γ) > 0
For λ > 0, the union’s payoff law is Ωslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) = λ
1−λ
Πslm(M, p
e, λ, γ) which implies
EΩslm(M) = EΠslm(M) > 0, EΩslm(p
e) = EΠslm(p
e) > 0, and
EΩslm(γ) = EΠslm(γ) > 0.
Once again due to opposing effects, the direction of an increase of union power λ cannot be
signed in general:
EΩslm(λ) = 1 + EPslm(λ) + EYslm(λ).
6.2 A Parametric Example
Assume
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• production function: F (z) = A
B
zB with A > 0, 0 < B < 1
• shareholder’s utility: log c0 + δ log c
e with δ > 0; implies c ≡ 1
δ+1
• disutility from labor: v(ℓ) = C
C+1
ℓ1+
1
C with 0 < C < 1
This implies
• hcom(α) = (
A
α
)
1
1−B
• Sres(
Lilm
γ
) = C
C+1
1
1−τw
(Lilm
γnw
)1/C , Scom(
Lilm
γ
) = 1
1−τw
(Lilm
γnw
)1/C
• S−1res (
α
θe
) = nw((1− τw)
C+1
C
α
θe
)C , S−1com(
α
θe
) = nw((1− τw)
α
θe
)C = Ncom(
α
θe
)
• heff(θ
e, γ) = (1− τw)
C
C(1−B)+1A
C
C(1−B)+1 (γnw)
1
C(1−B)+1 (θe)−
C
C(1−B)+1 ,
h−1eff (Lilm, γ) =
F ′(Lilm)
Scom(Lilm/γ)
• θe = W−1elm(αelm) =
αelm
Scom(hcom(αelm))
= (1− τw)n
1/C
w A
− 1
C(1−B)α
C(1−B)+1
C(1−B)
elm
• αelm = Welm(θ
e) = (1− τw)
−
C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1n
− 1−B
C(1−B)+1
w A
1
C(1−B)+1 (θe)
C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
• αilm = Wilm(θ
e, λ, γ) = A
Bγ
(
hcom(Welm(θ
e))
)B−1 (
λ(1− (1− γ)B) + (1− λ)γ BC
C+1
)
• AS slm(θ
e) = F (hcom(Welm(θ
e))) = A
C+1
C(1−B)+1 1
B
n
B
C(1−B)+1
w ( θ
e
1−τw
)−
CB
C(1−B)+1
• Dslm(m,λ, γ) =
m+g
c˜slm(λ,γ)
= m+g
1−c(1−τpi)(1−λ)(1−B+γ
B
C+1
)
• λcom(γ) =
γ B
C+1
1−B+γ B
C+1
• 0 < EDslm(m) =
m
m+g
≤ 1
• 0 < Ec˜slm(λ) =
c(1−τpi)(1−λ)(1−B+γ
B
C+1
)
1−c(1−τpi)(1−λ)(1−B+γ
B
C+1
)
≤
(1−λ)(1−B+γ B
C+1
)
1−(1−λ)(1−B+γ B
C+1
)
< 1
• EDslm(λ) = −Ec˜slm(λ), −1 < EDslm(λ) < 0
6.3 The Powerful Producer
In this section, it is assumed that the firm is able to demand on the competitive market alone,
i.e. to threaten to hire no unionized worker at all (Lilm = 0). Therefore, being active on two
labor markets has to yield a profit which has to be at least as high as the one the firm would
obtain on the competitive market alone, i.e. pF (hcom(welm/p))−welmhcom(welm/p). This is the
firm’s status quo; the status quo of the union remains zero. The bargaining problem is therefore
given by (
B(pe, p, welm, γ),
(
pF (hcom(
welm
p
))− welmhcom(
welm
p
)
0
))
(35)
where B(pe, p, welm, γ) is the same bargaining set as defined in (5).
Since the bargaining set is unchanged, the bargaining parties agree on the same employment
level Lilm = hilm(welm/p, p
e/p, γ) at which the feasible set is maximal. This implies that the
firm’s labor demand on the competitive market is given by Lelm = helm(welm/p, p
e/p, γ).
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Because of the different status quo, the firm’s reservation wage is different. It is given by
wilm
!
≤
pF (Lilm + Lelm)− welmLelm −
(
pF
(
hcom
(
welm
p
))
− welmhcom
(
welm
p
))
Lilm
=
pF
(
Lilm + h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
− welmh
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
Lilm
−
(
pF
(
hcom
(
welm
p
))
− welmhcom
(
welm
p
))
Lilm
=: WΠ(p, welm, Lilm).
To simplify notation, those functions which are altered due to the firm’s different status-quo
level, are not marked by an additional or different subscript. Note that
WΠ(p, welm, Lilm) =


welm, if h(
welm
p
, Lilm) > 0
pF (Lilm)−(pF(hcom(
welm
p ))−welmhcom(
welm
p ))
Lilm
, if h(welm
p
, Lilm) = 0
i.e. the wage paid to the union members for h(welm/p, Lilm) = hcom(welm/p) − Lilm ≥ 0 is at
most as high as the one paid under competition. This asymmetry guarantees an autonomous
rent to the firm whereas unionized workers are committed to supply their individual shares of
labor according to the aggregate level the union has sold to the firm.
The bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (35) remains structurally unchanged, i.e.
Πslm
(
p, ., welm, Lilm, h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
))
Ωslm(p
e, ., Lilm, γ)


=
(
WΠ(p, welm, Lilm)−WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ)
)(1− λ
λ
)
.
For a given employment level Lilm such that WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ) < WΠ(p, welm, Lilm), the wage
solving the firm’s and the union’s bargaining problem is given by the convex combination of
the two reservation wage functions, i.e.
wilm = λWΠ(p, welm, Lilm) + (1− λ)WΩslm(p
e, Lilm, γ)
=


λwelm + (1− λ)p
eSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
, if h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
> 0
λ
pF (Lilm)−(pF(hcom(
welm
p ))−welmhcom(
welm
p ))
Lilm
+ (1− λ)peSres
(
Lilm
γ
)
,
if h
(
welm
p
, Lilm
)
= 0
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 denotes the union’s relative bargaining power.
As before, the clearing of the labor market implies that welm/p = Welm(p
e/p) ≡ Wcom(p
e/p) as
well as
Lilm = γhcom
(
welm
p
)
= γNcom
(
welm
pe
)
and Lelm = (1− γ)hcom
(
welm
p
)
> 0.
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Let the aggregate employment level be denoted by L, i.e. L := hcom(welm/p) = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)),
which implies Lilm = γL and Lelm = (1− γ)L. Then, the profit share of total revenue is
pF (Lilm + Lelm)− wilmLilm − welmLelm
pF (Lilm + Lelm)
= 1−
λγwelmL+ (1− λ)γp
eSres(L)L+ welm(1− γ)L
pF (L)
= 1−
welmL
pF (L)
− (1− λ)γ
welmL
pF (L)
(
peSres(L)
welm
− 1
)
= 1− EF (L)− (1− λ)γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
so that
c˜slm
(
pe
p
, λ, γ
)
:= 1− c
(
pe
p
)
(1− τπ)
(
1− EF (L) + (1− λ)γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres(L) + 1
)
with L = hcom(Welm(p
e/p)). The aggregate demand function is therefore given by
Dslm(m, θ
e, λ, γ) :=
m+ g
c˜slm(θe, λ, γ)
=
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)
(
1− EF (L) + (1− λ)γ
EF (L)ESres(L)
ESres (L)+1
) ,
with L = hcom(Welm(θ
e)).
The change of the reservation wage function induces a different demand multiplier c˜slm(θ
e, λ, γ),
but neither new nor different structural properties of the aggregate demand function. Since the
aggregate supply function AS slm(θ
e) remains unchanged, the temporary equilibrium uniquely
exists under the same set of assumptions as in the previously treated case and displays the
same qualitative properties.
The competitive equilibrium is the special case λcom = 1.
Under the isoelastic specifications, aggregate demand function is given by
Dslm(m,λ, γ) =
m+ g
c˜slm(λ, γ)
=
m+ g
1− c(1− τπ)(1−B + (1− λ)γ
B
C+1
)
with
Ec˜slm(λ) =
c(1− τπ)λγ
B
C+1
1− c(1− τπ)(1−B + (1− λ)γ
B
C+1
)
≤
λ B
C+1
1− (1−B + (1− λ) B
C+1
)
=
λ
C + λ
< 1.
References
Böhm, V. (2017): Macroeconomic Theory, Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer
International Publishing, Cham.
Oliver Claas Labor Market Segmentation and Efficient Bargaining
References 40
Böhm, V. & O. Claas (2012): “Efficient Wage Bargaining in a Dynamic Macroeconomic
Model”, Discussion Paper 465, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics.
(2014): “Wage Bargaining, Employment, and Union Power: the Right-to-Manage
Approach”, Discussion Paper 502, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
Booth, A. L. (1995): The economics of the trade union. Cambridge Univ. Pr., Cambridge
a.o.
Bulow, J. I. & L. H. Summers (1986): “A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application
to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment”, Journal of Labour
Economics, 4(3), 376–414.
Cahuc, P. & A. Zylberberg (2004): Labor Economics. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Card, D., F. Devicenti & A. Maida (2014): “Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence
from Matched Panel Data”, Review of Economic Studies, 81(1), 84–111.
Dickens, W. T. & K. Lang (1988): “The Reemergence of Segmented Labor Market Theory”,
The American Economic Review, 78(2), 129–134.
Doeringer, P. B. & M. J. Piore (1971): Internal labor markets and manpower analysis.
Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.
Farber, H. S. (1986): “Analysis of Union Behavior”, in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. II
of Handbooks in Economics, S. 1039–1089. North Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford,
Tokyo.
Flaschel, P. & A. Greiner (2011): “Dual Labor Markets and the Impact of Minimum
Wages on Atypical Employment”, Metroeconomica, 62(3), 512–531.
Gerber, A. & T. Upmann (2006): “Bargaining solutions at work: Qualitative differences in
policy implications”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 52(2), 162–175.
Gottfries, N. & B. McCormick (1995): “Discrimination and open unemployment in a
segmented labour market”, European Economic Review, 39(1), 1–15.
Katz, L. F. (1988): “Some Recent Developments in Labor Economics and Their Implications
for Macroeconomics”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20(3), 507–522.
Landmann, O. & J. Jerger (1999): Beschäftigungstheorie. Springer, Berlin a.o.
Lindbeck, A. & D. J. Snower (1986): “Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider
Relations”, The American Economic Review, 76(2), 235–239.
McDonald, I. M. & R. M. Solow (1981): “Wage Bargaining and Employment”, The
American Economic Review, 71(5), 896–908.
(1985): “Wages and Employment in a Segmented Labor Market”, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1115–1141.
OECD (2017): OECD Employment Outlook 2017. OECD.
Selten, R. & W. Güth (1982): “Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple
business cycle model”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(2–3), 177–195.
Oliver Claas Labor Market Segmentation and Efficient Bargaining
References 41
Taubman, P. & M. L. Wachter (1986): “Segmented Labor Markets”, in Handbook of Labor
Economics, Vol. II of Handbooks in Economics, S. 1183–1217. North Holland, Amsterdam,
New York, Oxford, Tokyo.
Oliver Claas Labor Market Segmentation and Efficient Bargaining
